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INTRODUCTION 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopment disorder characterized 
by deficits in social interaction and poor communication skills (Wing and Gould, 
1997). Despite a growing research interest in the field, the causes of these 
impairments remain unknown.  
This research assumes that social interaction is mediated by environmental 
structures and that the space representation could underlie social cognition 
(Krueger, 2010). Thus, the topic of spatial cognition and its neural correlates, that 
allow constructing neuropsychological concepts such as spatial attention and 
spatial frameworks, and how these in turn are linked with the body parts, objects 
or actions will be considered as an explicative model. (Katzky, 1998; Committeri 
and Galati 2004; Halligan and Fink, 2003; Lloyd 2009; Turrell et al, 2011) 
  
The above premises offer indirect support to the importance of the ability to 
compare the own spatial point of view with another person point of view, which is 
based on aspects guided by spatial cognition. This suggest an influence in social 
perception and self-other recognition processes.	
	
In this regard, two lines of research, Theory of Mind (ToM) and Central 
Coherence (CC), starting from experimental tasks such as visuo-spatial 
perspective Taking (VPT) and the local and global levels documented the 
importance of visuo-spatial attention and the spatial variables in the self versus 
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other recognition, as a basis of the cognitive processes underlying the social 
interaction. According to spatial attention, such as observed in the Unilateral 
spatial neglect (USN), it may contribute to explain the differences in the spatial 
attention and the brain activation of autistic children in these two tasks. 
 
Within this framework, the present research aims to investigate whether some 
aspects related to spatial perception could be compromised in a task of ToM and 
CC in a sample of adolescents with ASD and Typical Development (TD). The 
first three chapters of this thesis show the different neurological and conceptual 
underpinnings and in the fourth and final chapter the methodological and 
experimental part are developed.  	
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CHAPTER 1 
AUTISM 
 
Autism literally means, "to live in terms of self". Autism is defined as a complex 
syndrome of development, manifested by similar clinical symptoms for multiple 
biological causes. This syndrome appears as a serious behavioural disorder caused 
by problems in neurodevelopment altering from the first years of life the ability to 
relate with others.  
The different pathological conditions observed in autism are divided into 
subgroups: in the first group the conditions are defined with genetic basis and in 
the second group the conditions are defined by genetic mutation, caused by 
infections, toxins or other environmental factors. Moreover in the last prenatal 
period or in the postnatal period, are affected brain areas involved in the 
development of different cognitive functions, such as shared attention, language 
and reasoning (Gillberg and Coleman, 2000). Damage to postnatal Purkinje cells, 
often observed in the brain dysfunction of autism, involves impairments of brain 
functions causing dysfunctions of movement, balance, posture, symmetry and 
planning (Kern, 2003). The criteria for the diagnosis of autism can be summarized 
briefly in four areas: the first one is linked with the abnormalities associated with 
the social reciprocity where the early indicators show in general a priority interest 
in objects rather than in people. The second one is related with the abnormalities 
in the development of language and communication skills. The third one is 
associated with behaviors, interests, repetitive and restricted activities and 
	 6	
imagination, where the early indicators are represented by the particular attraction 
to certain objects, sounds or movements. And the fourth one begins before age 
three and is related with the motor abnormalities where the early indicators are 
detected by the analysis of motion, and with seating and walking postures. 
 
1.1 Impairments in social interaction 
The various problems in social interaction have been represented as a macro area 
which, through clinical detection, can be identified an evident dysfunctionality of 
subject with autism in aspects like: an inadequate ability to grasp the socio-
emotional cues (this is demonstrated in lack of responses to other people’s 
emotions or absence of modulation of behavior according to social context) and 
poor use of social cues and a weak integration of social, emotional and 
communicative behaviors. 
 
The social interactions, at an early age, are sensory-motor order, guided by the 
perception of the outside world and by the development of functions such as: 
visual-motor coordination, which is able to direct the action itself toward a 
specific target located in the space, and the shared attention, which is able to 
share the meaning of an action or a particular interest with others. These functions 
are essential for the development of imitation at an early age (the ability to 
translate the body state of someone and to observe the motor elements needed to 
reproduce the behavior), and for abstract game and fiction. Often, these functions 
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are compromised in autistic subjects with difficulty to reaching development 
levels comparable to their peers.   
One of the hypothesis that could explain the social impairment of these subjects is 
the hypothesis that take the action like precursor of social cognition.  
 
1.2 Brain connectivity 
The understanding of different behaviors that encompass Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) includes also the need to observe this disorder through brain 
evidence disruption in functional and structural connectivity. Several studies, with 
different imaging methods in ASD brain, evidenced disruptions in functional and 
structural connectivity. The findings of these recent studies could be classified 
according to three types of activations.  In the first one, it was shown a reduced 
connectivity between anterior and posterior subnetworks in adolescents with ASD 
(Starck et al., 2013). Also Just et al 2012 reported a reduced long-distance 
connectivity of individuals with ASD.  In the second one, findings have reported 
an increased functional connectivity of right parietal region with prefrontal 
regions, (Redcay et al., 2013) also in fronto-striatal circuitry in adolescents and 
young adults with ASD (Dimartino et al., 2011; Delmonte et al., 2013). Finally in 
the third one it was described both increased and decreased connectivity in autistic 
brain (Müller et all 2011). In addition, Maximo et al., 2013 showed local 
increased connectivity in posterior occipital and temporal cortices along with local 
decreased connectivity, in posterior cingulated and medial prefrontal regions, in 
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adolescents with ASD. Coben et al., 2014 through these findings, suggested a 
theory of mixed under and over connectivity in ASD.    
Regarding visuospatial task and ToM in autism and its abnormal functional 
connectivity, these have been associated with white matter, especially during 
visuospatial processing in connections between left occipital lobe and some 
regions in the left hemisphere (McFadden et al, 2013).        
 
1.3 Cognitive Models 
The cognitive models of mental functioning are oriented towards explanations 
that are related to a dysfunctional neuropsychological level and hypothesized by 
the interpretation of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and its different 
manifestations. These models are Central Coherence and Theory of Mind. 
 
1.3.1 Central Coherence 
This model provides an explanation of some of the characteristics of autism 
ignored or unexplained by other models including a tendency to focus on parts of 
objects, extreme sensitivity to small changes in the environment and 
circumscribed interests (Happé, 1995). The proposal of this model is that persons 
with autism are deficient or have absence of normal tendency in information 
processing and in integrating information at a local level of organization; this 
means failures to draw together stimuli into coherent wholes. (Frith,1989). “The 
detection of the local level is slower in the TD subjects, because there is a global 
interference effect, in the central coherence theory, persons with autism do not 
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integrate information into higher levels of processing. Accordingly, they should 
display a unique local advantage as nonautistic persons typically show a faster 
(or better detection of global levels). Thus, with conditions designed so that 
persons without autism show no differences in responding to the two types of 
stimuli, the performance of persons with autism should be characterised by a 
local advantage” (Mottron, 1999). This theory has been explored with different 
experimental tasks such as interpretation of homographs in context (Happé, 1997; 
Snowling and Frith, 1986), judgments about 2D visual illusions (Happé, 1996; 
Ropar and Mitchell, 1999), Embedded Figures task  (Shah and Frith, 1983; Brian 
and Bryson; 1996), block Design Task (Shah and Frith, 1993; Ozonoff et al, 
1991) and hierarchization task (Mottron et al, 1999). Nevertheless the findings in 
these studies were contradictory.  
 
The roots of this model were located in the old relationship between the 
perception of parts and wholes that has been the central topic in the study of 
visual perception (koffka, 1935). In this way Navon in 1997 attempted to test the 
local and global processing, presenting hierarchical stimuli, in order to compare 
the time taken to identify the local versus global letters. The findings of this 
experiment showed that the reaction times were faster for global than for local 
letters, suggesting that visual perception proceeds in a global to local direction. 
These findings became a link with experimental research that has been interested 
in the perceptual and attentional abnormalities in subjects with autism like central 
coherence theory.  
	 10	
On the other hand there are several studies that attribute the processing of Global 
and Local information at the brain hemispheres activity.  These researches have 
been done with typical Development subjects (TD) and demonstrated the 
following results: Martin, 1979 and Sergent, 1982 showed that local stimuli 
presented in the right visual field were processed faster than Global stimuli and 
that Global targets presented in the left field were processed faster than Local 
targets. Robertson et al, 1993 reproduced these results. In other studies made with 
patients with focal brain lesions by Robertson et al, 1988 and Lamb et al, 1989, 
was confirmed that the left hemisphere has a processing advantage for Local 
targets while the right hemisphere has an advantage for processing Global stimuli. 
This study also proposed that a lesion in the inferior parietal lobule affects the 
ability to assign attention to one or the other level. This means that the temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ) may have unique importance for the lateralizing aspects of 
performance on the Global and Local tasks. Another region in the brain important 
for processing the hierarchical stimuli is the Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG) that 
was described in a research made by Lamb et al, 1990 with twelve patients with 
lesions that involved this region, where seven had left-hemisphere lesion LTSG 
and five had right-hemisphere lesion RTSG. This study evidenced a larger Local 
advantage if the lesion was on the right and a Global advantage if the lesion was 
on the left.                
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1.3.2 Theory of Mind  
The theory of mind (ToM), provides one of the etiological hypotheses most 
convincing of cognitive disorders of autism, focusing in the analysis of the 
difficulties in the child’s relationships. 
 
To posses a theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states (desires, 
emotions, intentions, thoughts and beliefs) and understand and predict the 
behavior of other persons on the basis of own internal states.  
The concept of ToM originates in the experimental models in etiology of Premack 
and Woodruf in 1978. They found evidence for the attribution of mental states to 
humans by chimpanzees. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) have shown experimentally that autistic 
children have similar abilities to their typical development peers in attributing 
physical causality to an event, but that they would not be able to represent the 
state of mind of self and others. These experimental analysis were partly based on 
two main analyses, the first one was based in Leslie (1987), where the importance 
of the underlying cognitive abilities in normal children of two years old in a 
pretend play was presented. And the second one was based in the observations 
that demonstrated some difficulties in the children with autism for imagination 
(Wulff, 1985). These data led also to the hypothesis that there could be a specific 
alteration of the necessary mechanism to represent mental states or “mentalizing”. 
Leslie (1987) suggested that this mechanism might be innate and specific, which 
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would imply that this function was damaged in a person with a normal 
intelligence in other ways. 
 
For the developmental psychology, the ToM has been an important model 
because from this theory the false belief paradigm has been developed (Perner and 
Wimmer, 1985). This paradigm has allowed the conceptual construction of social 
understanding in children.  
The ability to assign another knowledge, conviction or emotion develops in the 
child around the age of four. Before that age, children are not able to attribute a 
false belief (recognize the difference between the actual state of things and the 
mental representation of self or others). Baron-Cohen et al, 1985 found that the 
autistic children have impairment in this ability and even children with a normal 
IQ  (Perner et al, 1989).  
 
Over the time and with the different researches the ToM has extended to cover 
theoretical fields as empathy and embodiment contributing to the development of 
social cognition.   
In social cognition it is necessary to think about the contents of someone else’s 
mind. But there is another mechanism for accessing to the inner world of other, 
this mechanism is called embodied and it mediates between the multimodal 
experiential knowledge of our own lived body and the way we experience others 
(Gallese, 2007). The embodied also could underlie the capacity of empathizing 
(ability to infer and share the emotional experiences of another) (Gallese, 2003). 
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The neural mechanisms observed in patient groups lacking ToM or empathy 
reveal a network of three main areas associated with the processing of ToM:  the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
and the temporal poles (Frith and Frith, 2003). The activation of these areas 
during ToM tasks also can be understood through processes such as self and other 
distinction (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). The areas associated with empathy were 
the superior and inferior frontal gyrus, the precuneus and the middle temporal 
gyrus (Farrow et al., 2001).  
Finally Gallese, 2007 also proposed that embodied simulation could play an 
important role not only for the process of social cognition such as empathy but 
also on a more complex process like the attribution of mental states, where all 
these could be possible trough the mirror neuron system.      
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CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL CONCEPTS OF SPATIAL COGNITION 
 
2.1 Spatial Cognition and brain  
The exploration of environmental structures has always been in human beings one 
of the main mechanisms for the collection of information. This mechanism allows 
the generation of a spatial representation, which is in turn the key factor for 
navigating in the space.  
 
The space navigation is possible across landmarks because they help to organize 
the space and they are reference points in the environment (Sorrows and Hirtle, 
1999). The reference points in turn constitute the spatial frame of reference, where 
the reference frame is a mean for representing the locations of entities in space 
(Klatzky, 1998). Moreover many spatial reference frames are employed to direct 
behaviour and parietal cortex is the key for the construction of these 
representations (Colby & Goldberg, 1999 for a review).    
 
The brain uses codes for the spatial frame of reference and in this manner 
attributes characteristic such as up, down, left and right thanks to the bases 
generated by the different visual inputs (Halligan and Fink 2003). In this way the 
spatial acquisition is begun, particularly conformed by the landmarks orienting 
one’s self (egocentric frames). The body plays an important role for defining the 
egocentric frame because the references for the spatial location are relevant body 
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parts such as the eyes, head, trunk, and arms (Committeri and Galati 2004). The 
spatial position can also consider external references like objects; in this processes 
the coordinates are external or allocentric and have anatomical linkage between 
parietal and their cortical targets that furnish some insight into the spatial 
reference frames. Moreover parietal cortical areas are connected with areas of 
prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex, and the frontal and supplementary eye fields 
where the object locations are encoded relative to an assortment of reference 
frames. (Rizzolatti et al., 1981; Graziano et al., 1997)      
 
On the other hand, the perception of the external world seems unitary but is 
consequence of processing information coming from different parts of the space.  
This is because the brain produces a set of spatial representations and each 
representation is connected to a different action or region of the space (Colby & 
Duhamel, 1996; Fogassi et al 1996; Graziano et al 1994). Therefore the 
neuropsychological structure of the space is defined in three fundamental regions: 
personal space, peripersonal space and extrapersonal space.  Personal space is the 
space of the body surface, peripersonal space is the space within hands reach and 
extrapersonal space is the space beyond hands reach.  
 
The peripersonal and extrapersonal space have neuronal correlates that prevent it 
from being a rigid concept due to environmental stimuli that build flexible 
abilities that are modified according to the different necessities. For example, the 
different distances that human beings keep with objects and other human beings 
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are given by feelings as comfort, discomfort or dangerousness of a situation 
(Doesey and Meisels, 1969; Turrell et al 2011). This shows an inevitable 
connections between the actions deployed by others continuously in the ambient 
(Lloyd, 2009). In this way it is understood that body space and distance are 
defined as a dynamic concept due to social interactions.             
 
To understand what is so special about the topic of  “Space in the Brain” it is 
important to say that the brain uses two types of neural representation. The first 
type of representation is being given by the spatial frameworks linked with the 
body parts, object or action, and is essential for behaviours such as catching a ball 
or picking something. The second one is how the spatial frameworks are fixed 
with respect to the outside world, independent of particular actions and objects.  
 
To make effective a representation of the space are necessary several inputs that 
are encoded in the brain through the primary areas like primary visual cortex  and 
primary somatosensory cortex. The somatosensory cortex in turn integrates with 
the motor areas aiding to direct the movements unto a specific direction. 
Therefore what represents all this neuronal activity is the special relationship that 
exists between the information generated from the exterior and the body parts 
(hands, arms and trunk, etc.); thus allowing an integration of the spatial 
information in terms of various egocentric reference frames.  
The support for the egocentric frames can be of single cells in the primary areas 
mentioned beforehand. The information gathered by the these cells needs to be 
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translated and it seems that this translated cells are found in the front Parietal area 
7a in primates. “These neurons respond to visual stimuli at a specific retinotopic 
locations, but their rate of firing is also modulated by the orientation of the 
monkey’s gaze relative to the head… area 7a is the posterior parietal area most 
strongly connected with the medial temporal lobe and the neurons there whose 
firing is modulated by the orientation…can support translation between 
egocentric and allocentric representations of locations” (Andersen et al 1987 by 
Burges, 2008 for a review.).  
 
On the other hand, the neurons experts for answering to stimuli available in 
distance are located in the medial intraparietal (MIP). These neurons show a range 
of response from purely somatosensory, to bimodal, to purely visual (Colby & 
Duhamel, 1991). For example, the somatosensory neurons have receptive fields 
most often in the hands, while bimodal neurons reply to visual stimulus and to 
passive touch too. In addition, the bimodal neurons play an important role for 
reaching a visual target, which means that they are important for locating the 
target and for the arm that is used to reach toward it. Then there are, in the purely 
visual regions, the neurons that receive the signal of presence when the target is 
moved and can be reached with the arm.    
 
Another anatomical center for the allocentric frames can correspond to the “place 
cells” (§ 2). These cells are located in the hippocampal formation and their firing 
fields are anchored to the external environment and seem to be the base of the 
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cognitive map: representation of orientation. This cognitive map in turn is being 
given by the representation of the environment, places and objects within it that 
are to some extent independent of the body posture or orientation. In this way the 
hippocampus establishes the connexions between the spatial components such as 
places, routes, resources and goals in the long-term memory (Hartley et al, 2013 
for a review). 
 
2.2 Neglect  
Unilateral spatial neglect (USN) is a spatial disease characterized by the inability 
or failure to detect or respond to stimuli located in the contralesional side of the 
space. It is more frequent after a right hemisphere damage.  (J. Driver, P. 
Vuilleumier , 2001 Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein, 1985 Vallar 2001, Parton et 
al. 2004 ). 
In 1941 Russell Brain described for the first time this disorder. It can gather 
different clinical manifestations, sensorial level (visual, auditory or tactile), spatial 
reference frames (egocentric versus allocentric) and regions of space, near space 
(peripersonal space) and far space (extrapersonal space). These clinical 
manifestations in turn have contributed to the construction of the concepts 
referred to spatial cognition and its respective neural correlates (W.R. Brain, 
1941; F.H. Previc 1998; A. E. Hillis et all, 2005; C. Grimsen, et all 2008, T. C. W. 
Nijboer et all, 2014). 
The patient with this disorder, due to his neurological condition presents 
behavioural symptoms like eating only on the right side of the dish or tripping on 
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with the left side of her body. Another example is when a stimuli is presented on 
both sides (bilateral), her attention is immediately directed toward the stimuli on 
the right side ignoring completely the stimuli on the left side (Gainotti et al 1991). 
In visuo-spatial testing, they omit targets on the left in search tasks, deviate 
rightward when bisecting lines, and do not copy the left part of drawings. All 
these symptoms may be resumed as impairments in visual, auditory, tactile and 
motor abilities (Bisiach et al., 1984).    
 
The neurological condition of USN has helped to comprehend the brain 
mechanisms of attention and spatial processing such as near and far space, 
because different characteristics of patients with the spatial neglect have been 
documented. There are patients that presented neglect to near space (Berti and 
Frassinetti 2000), while others showed spatial neglect restricted to far space 
(Vuilleumier et al., 1998). And there are patients who presented spatial neglect in 
the absence of any distance modulation effects ((Pizzamiglio et al., 1989). USN is 
associated in most cases with lesions in the right posterior parietal cortex 
(Halligan et al., 2003) and there have been reports about the importance of 
parietal cortex as a component of the frontoparietal network of attention (Corbetta 
and Shulman, 2005). On the other hand numerous studies interrelated between 
spatial neglect and the egocentric and allocentric frames of reference have found a 
variety of results linking egocentric frame of reference with damage within the 
perisylvian network and damage within sub-cortical structure. In addition more 
posterior lesions were linked with allocentric symptoms (Chechlacz et al 2012).  
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 Another aspect of USN is the difference between perceptual neglect and 
representational neglect. The first is based on viewer-centered frames of reference 
(Driver & Pouget, 2000) and the second involves viewer-centered and allocentric 
coordinates. For example mental imagery could be operating with representations 
preserved independent of the viewer position (Ortigue et al 2001). Other previous 
studies have presented strong evidence to support an initial dissociation between 
perceptual and representational neglect (Bartolomeo et al., 1994; Coslett, 1997; 
Peru & Zapparoli, 1999). 
 
In light of the above is presented the challenge of observing this double 
dissociation between perceptual and representational neglect in spatial task that 
require the presence of another person, which enables a better observation and 
data collection at the behavioural level. In  2011 Becchio et al., with a spatial 
perspective taking task observed how patients with neglect would represent a 
spatial scene from the perspective of another person, finding that perspective 
taking significantly ameliorated neglect severity because the items were presented 
on the left side, and omitted when required to report from the first-person 
perspective (1PP), but could be reported when patients assumed a different spatial 
perspective as third-person perspective (3PP). This might imply that perspective 
taking influences the codification of space and objects in presence of another 
person. A similar effect was demonstrated by previous studies more associated to 
spatial transformation (Della Sala et al 2004; Beschin et al 2003).     
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2.3 Spatial orientation in subjects with Autism  
Meanwhile, research on this disorder constituted a possibility through the years 
for understanding spatial cognition; mainly in the field oriented to the visuospatial 
attention or spatial orientation in non social task. The visuospatial attention is an 
ability that is connected with the attentive field and has been, since the beginning, 
interested in the visual perception of the spatial relations of objects in the external 
world.     
 
Manifestations of USN opened the possibility of an explicative hypothesis about 
Autism based in the characteristics of the spatial attention in patients with neglect: 
“we suggest that the phenomenon of spatial neglect provides a model for 
understanding much of what is known about autism” (Bryson and Wainwright, 
1990). This gave rise to the development of the visual spatial performance in 
autism with a series of studies that started with the traditional orienting task in 
which are described characteristics in high- functioning adults like left visual field 
advantage, for the process of orienting to and detecting stimulus in visual space 
(Wainwright and Bryson, 1996); showing that the dominant right hemisphere for 
this process is that of normal subjects (Heilman and Van Den Abell, 1979). 
 
Other descriptions in visuo-spatial skills in Autism have been described through 
tests such as Figure Disembedding, Block Design and Navon Task, giving sustain 
to theories like Weak central coherence. Most of these tests have demonstrated 
that individuals with autism have intact and sometimes superior performance on 
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spatial tasks that require processing capacity for the details. (Jolieffe and Baron-
Cohen, 1997; Morgan, Mayberry, and Durkin 2003; Shah and Frith, 1993).  
 
On the other hand the visuo-perceptual processing have been divided in  two 
abilities. The first one is the ability to identify the orientation of simple, 
luminance- defined gratings (or first-order), and the second one is the ability for 
complex, texture- defined gratings (or second-order). In addition to this, in 
subjects with High Functional Autism (HFA) have been found data in which it is 
described an orientation and identification of thresholds significantly lower for the 
first order conditions. However, the thresholds are significantly higher for the 
same task using complex second-order stimuli when compared to the Typical 
Developmental (TD) (Bertone, Motron, et al 2005).  
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CHAPTER 3 
SPATIAL AND SOCIAL COGNITION IN AUTISM 
 
So far have been described various aspects and considerations of the concept 
spatial cognition, showing how it transversalizes many neuropsychological 
abilities like attention and perception. Another ability by excellence of the human 
being is the capacity to prosper in complex social situations (Gallese, Keysers and 
Rizzolatti 2004 for a review).  If the social interaction is mediated by 
environmental structures it can be considered that the social cognition is 
fundamentally an interactive form of space management” (Krueger, 2010). 
 
One of the disorders characterized by impairments in social interaction and 
communicative skills is Autism Spectrum Disorder (ADS). This disorder is a 
severe developmental disability. Despite a growing research interest in the field, 
the causes of these impairments remain unknown. 
 
It is within this framework that new lines of research have undertaken the 
challenge of describing the characteristics of some concepts that are 
interconnected with the social abilities and the elements of spatial cognition 
(spatial behavior) in ADS. These studies look into the ability self versus other 
evaluations with the aim to explore the neural representations that involved 
processes in self-other distinctions (N. David et al., 2008). 
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In the following sections are described how the introspective ability of self versus 
other evaluations is investigated. 
 
3.1 Self- other recognition	
The relationship between self and other is an ability that starts to show its 
development during the second year of life of the child and from that date 
presents a rapid increase (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). In the social cognitive 
framework this relation becomes established, especially in these years of 
development, in two categories of cognition. The first one is self-recognition 
ability (self-awareness) and the second one is self-consciousness, empathy and 
cooperation (other-awareness) (J. B. Asendorpf, V. Warketin and P. Baudonnière, 
1996). 
 
The relation self-other is a complex construct, but in the neurocognitive field this 
concept has been measured through an experimental task that has to do with self 
and other’s body processing. This is because the recognition of the parts of the 
own body not only account for the process of constitution of the self but also for 
the presence of body schema that seems to be closely interrelated with the 
peripersonal space, because in both terms there are overlap concepts belonging to 
spatial and bodily representation (L. Cardinalli,  C. Brozzoli, and A. Farnè, 2009). 
Furthermore, peripersonal space appears to be also susceptible to social 
interaction components (DM. Lloyd 2009). 
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Self and other representation in Autism has been an important theme because 
some differences have been found in its process with respect to subjects with 
typical development. These differences suggest that the nucleus of autism 
symptoms could be induced by a deficit in understanding the general relation 
between self and others (Gopnik A. and Meltzoff AN , 1994). This idea is tightly 
linked with the notion that impairments of higher-order mentalizing types are 
essential to social cognition (U. Frith, 2001). 
 
In addition to these self body recognition in autism recently has been described by 
authors like Erica Gessaroli et al., in 2013, showing that ASD children 
demonstrated better results with self than with others’ body and face parts.  They 
proposed in this study that the children with autism were able to distinguish self 
and others’ stimuli and to take an advantage in processing self-compared to 
others’ stimuli. Moreover they confirmed that the body self–advantage is a 
process implicit in a body specific knowledge based primarily on the sensorimotor 
representation of one’s own body-parts.  
 
On the other hand, the process of self-other recognition has been identified with 
its specific brain areas for each one of the two processes. This is how Uddin et al., 
in 2008, described, based on a comparative study between children with high-
functioning ASD and subjects with Typical Development (TD), the areas that 
sustain the process of self face recognition in other face recognition. In self face 
recognition were identified, for both groups, areas such as right lateral occipital 
cortex, right occipital fusiform gyrus, right temporal occipital fusiform cortex, 
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right precentral gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, right insular cortex, left lateral 
occipital cortex, left occipital pole, and left temporal occipital fusiform cortex. 
However, in other self recognition the ASD Group presented activation in right 
occipital fusiform gyrus, right lateral occipital cortex, left occipital fusiform 
gyrus, right lateral occipital cortex, left occipital fusiform gyrus, and left temporal 
occipital fusiform cortex. In contrast the TD group demonstrated activations in 
right occipital fusiform gyrus, right lateral occipital cortex, right inferior frontal 
gyrus, right precentral gyrus, right insular cortex, right frontal operculum cortex, 
left occipital fusiform gyrus, and left temporal occipital fusiform cortex. Finally 
this studio showed significant differences for the other recognition task especially 
in the right prefrontal cortex for ASD, because while TD children activated the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) when looking at images of others, there was no 
change in activity when the ASD did this same task. 
 
For having a description closer to the different hemispheric functions in the brain 
in the self and other’s body processing in children F. Frassinetti et al., in 2012, 
tested 74 children (57 healthy controls and 17 brain damaged) with stimuli that 
represented body parts and face parts of other people or of body parts of the 
children that did the experiment. The results of this research were interesting 
because they proposed three contributions: the first one is that the right 
hemisphere is specialized in processing self information of body parts and the left 
hemisphere is specialized in processing other information in children. Suggesting 
with this that the processing of self and others’ body parts is independent and 
could correspond to an anatomical independence. The second one proposed that 
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self-body and self-face parts seem separate as well as others’ body and others’ 
face parts processing. Finally this study found that in healthy children the self 
advantage is a normal process in the brain just like in the adults. 
 
The studies described above help to understand the process in autism. However, if 
these process are not clear and classified at the level of the brain, it is necessary to 
make the comparison with the specific damages in comparable subjects to try to 
understand how this process develop in autism and how it affects its complexity.  
 
3.2 Sense of agency  
The sense of agency is a crucial aspect to successfully navigate in the shared 
representation between self and other and in the ability to differentiate the 
personal perspective with that of the third person perspective (Decety and 
Sommerville, 2003; Decety, 2005). Another characteristic of the sense of agency 
is the ability to recognize one self as causally involved in action (Gallagher, 2000; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003); this is fundamental to social interaction.  
 
 At the same time, the sense of agency involves efferent copies of motor signals, 
and is expressed only for voluntary movements. The self-produced movements 
are constantly monitored, through the sensory feedback and efferent copies 
allowing to continually remodelling it. This system of control of movement is also 
able to establish 'who' has generated the observed movement. According to 
Jeannerod (2001), if the copies of motor and sensory feedback are triggered at the 
same time, the action is experienced as generated by itself. When subjects are 
	 28	
aware of causing an action, compared to the situation when they believe that it is 
performed by another, it is observed bilateral activation of the anterior insula, 
supplementary motor area (SMA), the lateral premotor cortex, and the cortex 
primary somatosensory (Farrer & Frith, 2002). For the perception of the acts of 
others, studies show a preference lateralized to the right (Ruby & Decety, 2001, 
2003; Leube, 2003), at the level of the inferior parietal cortex (Ruby & Decety, 
2001, 2003). Its activation seems to express the sense of the discrepancy between 
the own action and those performed by others (Farrer et al., 2003). In addition in 
the parietal cortex some neurons expressing bimodal property, reflect efferent 
copies and visual feedback. Moreover, the parietal cortex arises as a place where 
perception and action share a common code and neural architecture. 
 
Leube et al. (2003) made participants to observe a video illustrating their actions, 
where there was a short delay in time between the action performed and that 
shown on the monitor. The authors observed a positive correlation of activation in 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS) with the increase of the delay time. The 
dyssynchrony time between the observed action and the performed one, made the 
action to seem as not belonging to the self. These regions are also involved in the 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Apperly et al., 2004; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). 
 
The inferior parietal cortex and premotor cortex represent a frontoparietal 
connection. This connection is able to make consistent the external stimuli with 
our own body image, and in some cases transforms the body sensory experience 
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just to make it consistent with the information collected (Ehrsson et al., 2004). 
Observations of psychiatric patients emphasize the role of parietal cortex in 
supporting the sense of the agent. Damage to the parietal cortex, in fact, expresses 
the inability to recognize oneself as an agent of the action, and the feeling that it is 
controlled by someone outside the self (Murata & Ishida, 2007). 
 
Regarding the problematic with the sense of agency in ASD it could be identified 
as a process that underlie difficulties such as imitation, motor performance, visual 
processing of dynamic motion and executive function  (David et al., 2008).  
The studies developed in persons with ASD that have investigated sense of 
agency have linked the ability to distinguish between animate and inanimate 
objects (Celani, 2002; David et al., 2008). They found that individuals with ASD 
tested did not demonstrated impairments in the sense of agency or an intact 
system matching observed actions onto representations of one’s own actions 
(Sebanz et al, 2005) or a typical  “self-reference effect” recalling their own actions 
better than those of the experimenter (Williams & Happé, 2008).  
   
Several studies that inquire the attribution of action in autism are mixed with the  
attribution of mental states or imitation since they conform the nucleus of social 
cognition. For demonstration of the results found, Splengler et al (2010) with 
eighteen participants with autism tested with imitation-inhibition task, theory of 
mind task and functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that the brain areas 
that presented decreased activity during mentalizing with increased interference 
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effect in the imitation-inhibition task were mPFC, the TPJ and posterior superior 
temporal sulcus, confirmed that the activation in the mPFC is the key area in 
Theory of Mind (ToM) processing. As for the imitation-inhibition task the 
participants with autism showed increased imitation of hand actions compared 
with control participants demonstrating in turn more deficits to inhibit automatic 
imitation. These results were associated to a reduced mentalizing.  
 
On the other hand Jan Zwickel et al., throw a study in 2011 with nineteen 
participants with high functioning autism and eighteen neurotypical participants, 
observing the eye movements when watching animate triangles in short movies 
that normally evoke mentalizing, demonstrating that there were not differences in 
both groups because they showed the same increase in mean fixation duration, an 
indicator of information integration. This indicates that the operation involved in 
detecting a social agent is intact.     
	
3.3 Visual-spatial Perspective Taking 	
In the present epoch researchers have been interested in how the impairments in 
social cognition and abilities that require the use of spatial and social abilities are 
interrelated (A. Pearson 2013 for review). One way to assess this relation is the 
visual perspective taking (VPT). VPT is defined as the capacity to appreciate the 
world from another person’s perspective and have two levels defined by Flavell in 
1977. The level one (VPT1) is the ability to know what another person can and 
cannot see and the level two (VPT2) is the ability to comprehend that when two 
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persons see the same scene or object simultaneously, may nevertheless appear 
different to each person. In both levels the people should utilize the spatial and 
social information (reference frames of the viewer, position of target and the 
position of the object in the space in relation to self and others), because, “by 
interpreting the spatial relationships between objects in a social framework it 
becomes possible to form a rich representation of differing viewpoints which are 
useful in a variety of social tasks” (A. Pearson 2013 for review). 
 
VPT has been a topic of importance for autism, because it has provided value to 
the research of Theory of Mind (ToM)  (despite of others points of view). VPT 
and ToM seem to share cognitive processes (Hamilton, 2009). In different studies 
VPT in children with ASD and TD was compared, finding contradictory results in 
respect to the two levels of VPT.  In respect to VPT1 some of them report no 
differences between typical and autistic participants. On the contrary, in VPT2 
some of them found differences. Therefore the differences between VPT1 and 
VPT2 are not quite significant since the methodology between them is not clear 
either.  
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The following table describes some of the studies related to VPT1 and VPT2. 
Authors Paradigms Results 
Hobson (1984)	
Reed (2002) 
Task with question about 
item visibility (the child 
has to respond to whether 
the adult can see the 
item) (“hide and seek 
game” paradigm)  
(VPT1) 
The findings suggest that 
children with ASD are 
able to understand the 
concept of “hiding” and 
what other people can 
see.   
Leslie and Frith (1988)	
Baron-Cohen (1989) 
Line of sight paradigm 
(VPT1) 
Results showed no 
significance difference 
between TD and ASD 
groups. They suggest that 
the autistic children had a 
basic understanding of 
what the other could and 
could not see.   
Leekman et al (1997)	
Warreyn et al (2005) 
 
Line of sight paradigm 
(VPT1) 
The authors suggested 
that VPT may develop 
later in children with 
autism and that they may 
be delayed compared to 
TD children.  
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Mizuno et al (2011)	  Item appearance 
paradigm (VPT1)  
Showed that participants 
with autism were slower 
in the “what” condition 
than in the “who” 
condition.  
Reed and Peterson (1990)	 ToM and item 
appearance paradigm  
(VPT2) 
Found that the children 
with autism performed 
similarly to the typical 
children in the VPT task, 
but worse in the cognitive 
perspective taking task. 
Tan and Harris (1991)	 Item location paradigm 
and ToM (VPT2) 
The autistic children 
performed similarly to 
the typical children on 
both VPT and desired 
understanding. 
Yimiya et al (1994)	
 
Object rotation paradigm 
(VPT1) 
Found that children with 
ASD showed a higher 
number of errors than the 
typical children.  
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Hamilton et al (2009)	 Object rotation paradigm 
and ToM 
Results showed that the 
children with ASD were 
significantly worse on the 
VPT trials compared to 
the typical children, but 
performed better on the 
mental rotation task.  
Dawson and Fernald 
(1987)	
 
VPT and ToM In ToM task results 
showed that the ASD 
participants were 
significantly slower and 
less accurate at 
identifying the correct 
answer when mentalizing 
for other. They were also 
trending toward slower 
mentalizing for self. 
There were no 
differences found 
between groups for speed 
accuracy in the VPT task, 
for self or other.    
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Zwickel et al (2011)	 VPT and ToM Typical and autistic 
participants showed a 
congruency effect, 
demonstrating that they 
could spontaneously 
consider the left/right 
orientation of an 
animated shape. 
However, the autistic 
participants were less 
good at judging the 
mental states of the 
triangles in the same 
animations.   
	
 
VPT is an ability that each day more researchers have linked to spatial terms. 
Proofs of this are the VPT studies that have been involved recently in the spatial 
transformations. Spatial transformations are the process we use to align different 
three dimensional representations with each other across variations in position and 
orientation. By transforming ourselves to a different point in space it becomes 
possible to judge what is on another person’s left or right, or to make predictions 
about how things may appear from a different visual perspective.  (Pearson et al., 
2014). 
 
The spatial transformations are divided in two types, egocentric transformations 
and mental rotations. The first one, is self based and is used when the person 
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transforms her body as a whole aligned with a new position in space (Zacks et al, 
1999). This contributes to VPT, because they allow a person to place herself in 
another person location, and then to imagine what another person can see from a 
different viewpoint (Steggeman et al 2011; Surtees et al 2013; Yu and Zacks 
2010). The second one is the process by which the persons can manipulate the 
orientation of objects in their minds (Shepard and Metzler 1971; Wraga et al., 
2003) and could be used to take another person’s perspective (A. Pearson et al., 
2014).  
 
The spatial transformations are an important factor in the social interaction 
because they allow to imagining our own body in the place of another person’s 
body (Michelon and Zacks 2006). This can imply that spatial transformations 
underlie VPT and for this reason plays an important role in trying to understand 
the mechanisms that lie behind the social impairments in autism. 
 
Regarding autism and mental transformations recent studies have searched the 
definition of these characteristics in subject with ASD with different methods and 
doing comparison with proves in TD. David et al. (2010) published results that 
showed no significant differences in regards to response time or accuracy between 
the ASD and TD groups, suggesting no differences in egocentric transformation 
abilities. In regard to response time or accuracy between the ASD and TD groups 
they suggested no differences in egocentric transformation abilities. On the 
contrary, Kessler and Wang (2012), Brunye (2012) and Pearson et al. (2014), in 
three separate studies but using a similar method, found that participants with 
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higher levels of autistic traits displayed difficulty with performing egocentric 
transformations and were more likely to rely on an object focused rotation 
strategy.  
 
As for mental rotation in autism several studies have shown that people with ASD 
appear to have an intact mental rotation ability (Falter et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 
2009; Soulieres et al. 2011; Pearson et al., 2014). 
 
Another important aspect to review are the brain regions recruited in VPT tasks. 
As have seen before different methods have been designed to investigate not only 
the behavioural aspect but also the brain zones involved in the process of VPT. In 
these studies it is evident how the concept “self” has been adopting different 
approaches as for example the skill to assume a first-person perspective (1PP) is a 
way to make reference to the self- referring; namely, the 1PP can be treated as an 
elemental component of a “minimal self” (Gallagher, 2000). Based on this the aim 
have been to provide an understanding to the differentiation of self-other 
investigating the neural correlates of first-person perspective (1PP) and third-
person perspective (3PP). 
    
In the same line Volgeley et al., (2004) with a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), revealed both common and differential neural correlates for 
perspective taking in a simple visuo-spatial task to be performed from either 
someone else viewpoint (3PP) or one’s own viewpoint (1PP). The findings 
demonstrated differential brain activations, meanwhile in 3PP the activations were 
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located in precuneus, the right superior parietal and right premotor cortex; in the 
1PP was observed an increase of activation in mesial cortical regions.  
  
In the following table a detailed description of the other brain activations found in 
the study described previously is presented.  
 
Brain activations 
1PP-3PP common 
activations	
3PP relative to1PP 1PP relative to 3PP 
Right medial occipital 
gyri	
Precuneus Right insula  
Left precuneus	 Right inferior frontal 
gyrus 
Left inferior temporal 
gyrus  
Left inferior occipital 
gyri 	
Left cerebellum  Superior frontal gyrus 
Right inferior frontal 
gyrus	
Left inferior occipital 
gyri  
Posterior cingulate gyrus 
Left cerebellum 	 Right cerebellum Left medial temporal 
gyrus 
Left inferior parietal 
lobule 	
Left inferior frontal 
gyrus 
Left posterior cigulate 
gyrus 
Left superior frontal 
gyrus 	
Left inferior parietal 
lobule 
Anterior cingulate gyrus  
Left precentral gyrus	 Left medial frontal gyrus Left medial frontal gyrus 
Left superior frontal 
gyrus	
Left occipital gyrus Right postcentral gyrus 
	  Right posterior 
cingulated gyrus 
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On the other hand in 2006 N. David et al., with an experiment where the 
participants play a virtual ball-tossing game, searched the neural representations 
of first-person (1PP) vs. third-person perspective (3PP). In this studio the 
increased neural activity during 1PP was observed in cortical middle structures 
such as the left medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (extending to the superior frontal 
and right anterior cingulated cortex) and bilateral posterior cingulate cortices and 
in temporal regions including bilateral middle temporal gyrus, left superior 
temporal gyrus, and left amygdala. In addition in this perspective were elicited 
activations in the angular gyrus within the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL), in the 
right buscentral gyrus, bilateral posterior insula, left visual cortical areas such as 
the calcarine sulcus and cuneus, and left posterior orbital gyrus.  On the other 
hand, neural activity in 3PP was showed in the right superior parietal lobe and the 
right cuneus, in the left inferior frontal cortex, in the right middle frontal-premotor 
cortex, right brainstem, bilateral thalamus, bilateral anterior insula, right anterior 
cingulated cortex, and right cerebellum. 	
In 2007  D’argembeaud et al., remarks the distinct regions of the Medial 
Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) associated with self referential processing and 
perspective Taking while the participants made judgments on a series of 
adjectives describing personality traits. In the results these authors described in 
the self-referential processing the principal effect of judgment target that yielded a 
large activation cluster in the MPFC, which encompassed the dorsal (BA 9) and 
ventral (BA 10) portions of the anterior MPFC and the anterior cingulated cortex 
(BA 32). Respect to the self targets and other targets they showed one difference 
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in the MPFC. This difference demonstrated an increase in neural activity in self 
targets and lesser decrease in neural activity in other targets in this region. 
Regarding to the results of the ability of perspective taking in this same research 
the authors described the main effect of judgment perspective that showed 
activation in the left dorsal MPFC (BA 6), posterior to the medial prefrontal 
regions. The changes in this area were increased for the third-person perspectives 
as compared to the first-person perspectives. Moreover the principal effect of 
judgment perspective also produced activation in the lingual gyrus (BA 18), in the 
left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), in the precuneus (BA 7), in the left temporal 
pole (BA 20) and in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 10).  
 
Finally in 2013 Mazzarella and colleges registered the activation in brain areas 
while the participants did egocentric and alterecentric tasks. The brain areas 
described for alterecentric were bilateral inferior occipital gyrus extending into 
fusiform gyrus and lateral occipitotemporal cortex, intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and 
dorsal premotor cortex (PMd). In addition the brain areas corresponding to the 
egocentric task were bilateral inferior occipital gyrus extending into fusiform 
gyrus and lateral occipitotemporal cortex, right IPS.  
 
These studies mention the outstanding areas in the different task that comprehend 
the ability of perspective taking with a prevalence of three areas together but with 
different parts such as premotor cortex, parietal lobe and medial prefrontal cortex. 
Finally with all the studies described previously it can be observed how it has 
been investigated in Autism the process of recognition and differentiation of self-
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other in different tasks. Although there is a great diversity of this disturb, these 
studies have shown different impairments in this process, shedding light in 
general on the descriptions made by Kanner in 1943 where he noted self-deficits 
linked with difficulties in maintaining a constant self-concept and problems for 
adapt its “self” to the rapidly changing environment, that are better defined in 
depth both as at the behavioural level and its neural correlates. Therefore 
concluding in general that there exist specific disruptions in self-information and 
its neural systems involved. These neural systems comprehend two main areas 
where some failures of individuals with autism have been found. The first one is 
the middle cingulate cortex that in autism responds better to other than self-tasks 
especially in the mentalizing judgements tasks (Lombardo et al., 2010). 
Meanwhile the second one is the lack of responsiveness to self information in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Thus demonstrating that the centrality of an 
impaired relation of self-other in ASD has been the focus because it might be 
essential for understanding the deficits in social interaction. Furthermore, with all 
the research “there is substantial evidence that early deficits in self-development 
including impaired relations with others result in a fragmented and atypical sense 
of self in ASD” (Lyons & Fitzgerald, 2013).    
 
3.4 Social interaction and spatial cognition 
Self-other body recognition, sense of agency and Visuospatial Perspective Taking 
are abilities that in their description demonstrated how the body, the appreciation 
of different perspectives and the understanding of actions interact with spatial 
cognition. Therefore becoming themselves variables that contributed to the 
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understanding and research of the problems of autism; in specific the problem that 
has to do with social interaction and communication.  
 In this line of reasoning, Iachini et al., in a research made in 2013, revealed the 
existence of a strong relationship between body space and social interactions. In 
this study eighteen participants made four experimental conditions related to the 
judgment of distance in Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR). The main results 
showed that peripersonal reaching and interpersonal comfort spaces (given by the 
distance between self and the virtual stimulus that makes one feel uncomfortable) 
share a common motor nature and are sensitive, at different degrees, to social 
modulation. In this way, the findings reported a close relationship between basic 
visuomotor-spatial processing and complex social processing. Furthermore, in a 
framework where sensory information is processing by the body (embodiment), 
this study suggested too that social distance is influenced by the experience of the 
body acting in space. 
 
On the other hand, the body represents an important agent in ASD, especially in 
body self-other recognition tasks. About this, Zamagni et al., 2011 tested the 
influence of emotional body posture on bodily self-processing in typical 
development (TD) and subject with autism (ASD), founding that the bodily self 
advantage was presented in both TD group and ASD group suggesting with this, 
that the low level of self awareness could be intact in autism. Finally, the second 
result showed that self-advantage is modulated by emotional body posture. This 
advantage was found also in both TD and ASD groups with expressions such as 
	 43	
happy and neutral but not with fear, because in this last one there was a selective 
advantage for other stimuli as a sign of the importance of safety in evolution. 
 
One recent research that linked the corporeal distance during the social interaction 
in ASD was developed by Gessaroli et al., 2013, by studying how concepts as 
body space and personal space are closely related to the self-other process. They 
used an adapted version of the stop distance paradigm for comparing the 
interpersonal distance before and after the interaction with the adult confederate in 
TD and ASD groups of children. The findings of this experiment evidenced that 
personal space regulation is impaired in the ASD group because the ASD children 
were less tolerant to close proximity to a strange adult and prefer more 
interpersonal distance than TD children. However the interpersonal distance 
increased when the ASD children moved away than when they approximated 
toward the target feeling more uncomfortable and react. The authors suggested 
that personal space in ASD is damaged in two characteristics, permeability and 
flexibility, reflecting in turn impairments in their social interaction.        
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INFLUENCE OF SPATIAL COGNITION IN THEORY OF MIND 
AND CENTRAL COHERENCE TASKS: STUDY IN AUTISM 
 
4.1 Experiment 1. 
Local and global processing in the spatial attention 	
	
The weak central coherence hypothesis of Frith is one of the main cognitive 
models interested in the perceptual and attentional abnormalities in Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Under this hypothesis, experimental research has been 
interested in describing the performance of individuals with autism on tasks that 
involve local and global processing. In general, it has been found that there are 
impairments in the global processing in autism. One of the most important 
considerations in this experiment was that the left hemisphere has a processing 
advantage for local targets while the right hemisphere has an advantage for 
processing global stimuli (Robertson et al., 1988; Lamb et al., 1989). For this 
reason, in this experiment the spatial perception was an important element 
because the question in general was: if the spatial elements (right and left) could 
influence the response in the global and local task. 
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4.1.1 Objective of the experiment 
The aim of the experiment was to investigate the attentional local and global 
processing, modulating the stimuli presentation in the spatial horizontal plan (left 
vs. central vs. right)  
 
4.1.2 Material and Methods	
4.1.2.1 Participants	
20 adolescents: 10 adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 10 
adolescents with typical development (TD) were selected for this study. The 
Autistic adolescents (mean age= 13,5 ±2 years) were recruited from the 
‘Laboratorio dei Talenti’ project. They have been diagnosed by clinicians 
according to current diagnosis of Autism that requires scores above the ASD 
cutoffs on the Autism Diagnostic Observation schedule (ADOS) and the DSM-IV 
criteria for autism. The TD adolescents (mean age 14,2 ±2 years) were recruited 
at a local school and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological 
illness, as determined by clinical history. ASD and TD participants had an IQ ≥ 70 
on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children (WISC). Parents gave written 
informed consent.	
 
4.1.2.2 Stimuli  
A set of hierarchically formed numbers with global and local levels was 
constructed. The larger global numbers were composed of the appropriate 
placement of the smaller local numbers within a 3 (horizontal) x 5 (vertical) cm 
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matrix. Global stimuli were 25x45mm and subtended approximately 2.6° visual 
angle horizontally and 4.7° vertically. Local stimuli were 2x3mm and subtended 
approximately a visual angle of 0.21° horizontally and 0.31° vertically. The 
numbers 1 and 2 served as targets, while 3 and 4 served as distractors. Each task 
contained one target and one distractor crossed with the global and local levels 
(see figure 1). There was another stimulus call neutral that consisted in a simple 
number target 1or 2 with the same measures of global level but without 
distractors. The stimulus neutral was presented randomly like the local and global 
stimuli. All stimuli were black and presented on a white background. 
	
Figure.2	
	
Figure 1. Example of stimuli constructed in three different tasks. The first image 
represents the task that contains the target global 2 and distractor 3, the second one 
represents the task that contains the target global 1 and distractor 3 and the last one 
represents the task that contains the target local 1 and distractor 4.   	
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4.1.2.3 Procedure	
Stimuli were presented in a Macbook Air 13’. Each task contained one target and 
one distractor crossed with the global, local and neutral levels. The stimuli were 
presented one at a time to the left, center or right of the screen randomly, there 
was a 1000msec inter trial interval always with the central fixation point. The 
participant was sat directly in front of the computer at standard distance of 
approximately 54 cm from the screen. His hand rested over the x mark that was 
positioned at 30 cm of the keyboard where were placed the buttons with the 
numbers 1 and 2 for answering in the left, center and right.	
Eighteen practice trials were administered and in the instruction was specified that 
the response should be as rapid and accurate as possible, always returning the 
hand over the x mark after each response. The participant mark 1 when there was 
a one in the trial or 2 when there were a two in the trial, respectively in the space 
where it was found (left, center or right). Reaction times were recorded with 
Psyscope X B77.   	
	
4.1.3 Experimental design	
The experiment includes 3x3 factorial design with the factors: Level (Local vs. 
Global vs. Neutral) and Space (Left vs. Right vs. Central). The within factor was 
the subject variable, the between factor was the Group (ASD vs TD). This 
paradigm has one session of 144 trials.	
	
	
	 48	
4.1.4 Results	
The reaction times were analyzed using ANOVA repetitive measure. On the basis 
of the results, ANOVA showed significant main effect for the factor Group [(f 
(1,18) = 17.45 p = 0.0006], this evidence that the ASD group was slower than the 
TD group. The Level factor was also significant [f (2,36) = 26.11 p = 0.0001] 
showing a decrease in reaction times in the condition Neutral. 	
The interaction of Group x Level was significant [f (2,36) =5,27 p = 0.009].  Also 
the third interaction between the factors Group x Level x Space was significant [F 
(4,72) = 3.16; p = 0.01] (see figure 2), this evidence suggests that the ASD group 
was slower to respond to the left in the global level. Also the double interaction 
was significant like the third interaction. 	
The Duncan test for post-hoc analysis evidenced that the ASD group takes longer 
in the global level to the left space compared with the local level to the left space 
(p = 0.0008). Also to the left the ASD Group was slower in both global and local 
level compared with the neutral level (p = 0.0001). The neutral Level in the 
central Space compared with the local (p = 0.0001) and global level (p = 0.0002) 
in the same central space showed to be faster. Also, to the right neutral Level, it 
was faster than global (p = 0.0001) and local level (p = 0.0002) to the right.	
In all conditions the ASD group had the worst performance or a number of 
reaction time longer than TD group. The TD group in the neutral vs. right, neutral 
vs. left and neutral vs. central had a greater performance than in the local vs. left 
(p = 0.006), local vs. central (p = 0.005) and local vs. right (p = 0.02).	
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Figure 2. Mean RTs of correct responses in the different experimental conditions 
(Global, Neutro and Local levels; Left, Right and Central space in ASD and TD subjects). 
In general it is possible to observe that the longer times in Global x Left in ASD subject. 
Error bars indicate standard error of mean.     	
	
4.1.5 Discussion	
The aim of the experiment was to investigate the attentional Local and Global 
processing, modulating the stimuli presentation in the spatial horizontal plan (left 
vs. central vs. right). The main results showed an evidence for the presence of 
dysfunction of right hemispheric spatial attention mechanism in ASD group. In 
general the ASD group have more times longer than the TD group. But when the 
task in Global level was positioned in the left space the ASD group took longer 
times respect to local and neutral levels in the left, right and central space. This 
phenomenon could be associated with several studies that attribute the processing 
of global and local information at the brain hemispheres activity. These researches 
have demonstrated that Local stimuli presented in the right visual field were 
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processed faster than Global stimuli and that Global stimuli presented in the left 
field were processed faster than Local stimuli. (Martin, 1979; Sergent, 1982; 
Robertson et al., 1993). This phenomenon refers to the fact that the left 
hemisphere has a processing advantage for Local targets while the right 
hemisphere has a processing advantage for processing Global targets (Robertson 
et al, 1988; Lamb et al., 1989). Starting from this, we hypothesize impairments in 
ASD subjects in the right hemisphere not only to process the global stimuli but 
also in the spatial attention in general because in the computing of hierarchical 
stimuli also play an important role areas such as inferior parietal lobe. A lesion in 
this area affects the ability to assign attention to Global or Local level (Robertson 
et al., 1988), to respond to relevant stimuli when these appear in unexpected 
locations in the visual field (Posner et al., 1984) and the performance on spatial 
relations tasks.  These abilities most often present some difficulties in ASD 
subjects. According with this interpretation, it is well known that the right parietal 
damage could result in hemispatial neglect, so it is for this reason that we 
modulate the stimuli in the spatial horizontal plan (left vs. central vs. right). This 
is because, according to spatial attention such as observed in the Unilateral Spatial 
Neglect (USN), we hypothesize that explaining the differences in the spatial 
attention could contribute for understanding autism spectrum disorder.    
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4.2 Experiment 2.	
Perspective Taking from the space	
	
Visual perspective taking (VPT) is defined as the capacity to appreciate the world 
from another person’s perspective contributing not only to research how the 
impairments in social cognition and abilities that require the use of spatial and 
social abilities are interrelated (Pearson, 2013 for a review), but also to provide 
value to the research of Theory of Mind (ToM). VPT and ToM seem to share 
cognitive processes (Hamilton, 2009), and bring the possibility to explain of 
complex symptoms of Austim Spectrum Disorder. For this reason this experiment 
took a methodology where it was possible to investigate how children with autism 
would represent a spatial differentiation in a task where the self-other 
differentiation also was possible. In this way, the general findings showed 
important differences in left and right space in the first and third person 
perspectives that could be explained through the different clinical manifestations 
in Unilateral Spatial Neglect (USN).    	
	
4.2.1 Objective of the experiment 
The aim of this study was to investigate how children with autism would represent 
a spatial differentiation (left-right) in a task of perspective taking with a first 
person perspective (1PP) and a third person perspective (3PP) modulated in two 
dimensions.       
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4.2.3 Material and Methods	
4.2.3.1 Participants	
20 adolescents: 10 adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 10 
adolescents with typical development (TD) were selected for this study. The 
Autistic adolescents (mean age= 13,5 ±2 years) were recruited from the 
‘Laboratorio dei Talenti’ project. They have been diagnosed by clinicians 
according to current diagnosis of Autism that requires scores above the ASD 
cutoffs on the Autism Diagnostic Observation schedule (ADOS) and the DSM-IV 
criteria for autism. The TD adolescents (mean age 14,2 ±2 years) were recruited 
from a local school and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological 
illness, as determined by clinical history. ASD and TD participants had an IQ ≥ 70 
on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children (WISC). All participants had 
normal visual-perspective taking, ability necessary for the task. Parents gave 
written informed consent.	
 
4.2.3.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted in a real Display case of 51cm x 51cm with sets 3x3 shelves 
with measures of 17cm x 17cm. Each shelf was identified by its position in the 
Display case. In each shelf was placed one object. Three pairs of objects were 
used. Each pair consisted in the same object differing by the color. 
 In addition two experimental conditions were compared. Common Ground (CG), 
and Privileged Ground (PG). In the CG condition the experimenter’s question 
included a target object that had a contrasting object that differed in color (red 
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apple and green apple) (see figure 1.) In this condition, the objects were visible to 
the participant and to the experimenter who ask the question. 	
The second condition PG, also included the target and the contrasting object, but 
crucially here the contrasting object was obscured from the 3PP experimenter’s 
view (see figure 2.).	
The Display case and the keyboard were placed on a table. The participant was 
seated in front of the display case and the keyboard. There were 2 experimenters, 
1PP (first personal perspective) and 3PP (third personal perspective). The 1PP 
experimenter stood in front of the display and next to the participant. The 
participant and the 1PP experimenter had the same visual perspective and could 
see all the objects, while the 3PP experimenter stood behind of the display and 
could not see the objects placed in the obscured shelves. 	
Reaction times were recorded with Psyscope X B77. 	
	
4.2.3.3.Procedure 	
 The participant was seated across the table at standard distance of approximately 
58 cm from the display.  Before starting the task the participant was shown both 
sides of the display and was asked how many objects could see 1PP and 3PP 
experimenters and if the 3PP experimenter could see something that was placed in 
the obscured compartment. 	
In each trial 1PP and 3PP experimenters (randomly) made the questions “where 
is” referring, to a particular pair of objects that could be in PG or CG condition. 
The participant responded by pressing the key that corresponded at the object in 
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the display. The keyboard had a drawing of display and the number of keys 
corresponded to the numbers and positions of shelves. 	
	
	
	
	
	
4.2.3.4 Experimental design	
The experiment includes 2x2x2 factorial design with the factors: Perspective  
(1PP vs. 3PP) Dimension (Privileged Ground-PG vs. Common Ground-CG) and 
Space (Left vs. Right). The within factor was the subject variable and between 
factor was the Group (ASD vs TD). This paradigm has 4 sessions, each of 14 
trials for a total of 56 trials.	
	
Figure 1. Example of Common 
Ground (CG) condition.  
Figure 2. Example of Privileged 
Ground (PG) condition.  
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4.2.4 Results	
The reaction times were analyzed using ANOVA repetitive measure. On the basis 
of the results, ANOVA showed significant main effect for the factor Group [f 
(1,19) = 13,35; p = 0.001], this evidence that the ASD group was slower than the 
TD group. The space factor was also significant [F (1,19) = 5.89; P = 0.02] 
showing an increase in reaction times to the right space. 	
The interaction of Space x Perspective was significant [f(1,19) = 7.34; p = 0.01] 
with reaction times of the 3PP factor that increase in the right space and decrease 
to the left space. The fourth interaction between the factors Group x Perspective x 
Dimension x Space was significant [F(1,19) = 4.51; p = 0.04]. 	
It was effected the Duncan test for post-hoc analysis evidencing a difference 
between 1PP and 3PP in the ASD group to the left space in CG, the ASD group 
was faster for response in 3PP rather than 1PP (p = 0.01). Likewise, to the left 
space the 3PP was faster than to the right space also in 3PP (p = 0.03). Also the 
ASD group in the CG to the left space in 3PP showed to be faster compared with 
right space in PG (p = 0.01) and in 1PP (p = 0.01).	
 In the comparison between ASD and TD Groups, in the interaction 1PP in CG to 
the left space, the ASD Group was slower than TD group (p = 0.001) (see figure 
3). In this same comparison between groups, in PG to the left space in 3PP the 
ASD group was slower than TD group (p = 0.02), while in 1PP the ASD group 
was slower to the right space compared to TD group (p = 0.007) always in PG 
(see figure 4.).    	
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Figure 3. Mean RTs of correct responses in the dimension CG with the different 
experimental conditions (1PP and 3PP perspective in Left and right space). It is possible 
to observe that ASD subjects showed longer times in the left space when the perspective 
was in 1PP respect to the TD subjects. Asterisk indicates significant comparison (p = 
0.001). Error bars indicate standard error of mean.      	
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Figure 4. Mean RTs of correct responses in the dimension PG with the different 
experimental conditions (1PP and 3PP perspective in left and right space). It is possible to 
observe that ASD subjects showed longer times to left space when the perspective was 
3PP (p = 0.002) and longer times to right space when the perspective was 1PP respect to 
TD subjects. Asterisk indicates significant comparison. Error bars indicate standard error 
of mean. 	
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4.2.5 Discussion 	
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized 
by deficits in social communication and restricted interests (Wing and Gould 
1997).  Here we consider that the social interaction is mediated by environmental 
structures and that the space representation could underlie the social cognition 
(Krueger, 2010).  
In this line of reasoning, the aim of this study was to investigate how children 
with autism would represent a spatial differentiation in a task of perspective 
taking with a first person perspective (1PP) and a third person perspective (3PP) 
in two dimensions. The first one being a perceptual dimension (CG) linked to the 
spatial orientation and the second one being a representative dimension (PG) of 
the social type. The result of this experiment showed significant differences in 
perspective factor (1PP and 3PP) related with the factor space (left and right) in 
both dimensions highlighting, in the perceptual dimension (CG), the comparison 
between ASD subjects, and in the representational dimension (PG), the 
comparison between ASD and TD group.            
We suggest that Unilateral spatial neglect (USN) has different clinical 
manifestations that contribute to explain the differences in the perceptual 
dimension (CG) of autistic children in a task of Visuo-spatial perspective taking 
(VPT). 
For these reasons, in the perceptual dimension CG the results showed that the 
autistic group in the 1PP was slower in the left space in respect to TD children for 
whom in this condition there were no significant differences in the factor space 
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(left and right). Meanwhile in the 3PP, the ASD group was faster in the left space 
and the TD group did not obtain significant differences. These findings suggest 
that the ASD children have a similar behavior in VPT task as the patients with 
neglect, because there is an ease in children with ASD for answering in the right 
space and take longer times toward the left space in the 1PP.  
On the other hand, in the 3PP the results demonstrated how the difficulties 
disappear in the left space just like patients with neglect have demonstrated (C. 
Becchio et al., 2011). This is because it seems that perspective taking significantly 
ameliorated the responses (RT) in the left space when the ASD children assumed 
a different spatial perspective (3PP-self). In addition it is known that lesion in the 
right parietal is the main cause of neglect. For this reason, we suggest 
impairments in right parietal in children with ASD because this area along with 
the right premotor cortex are involved in spatial tasks (Colby and Golberg, 1999), 
including tasks related to spatial transformation of objects (Lamm et al., 2001). 
These findings could explain the shorter times in ASD in answering to the stimuli 
that were in the left space. Furthermore these regions are also activated in 
egocentric tasks, in which subjects make judgments on the midsagittal position of 
objects in relation to themselves (Misaki et al., 2002). This could offer a 
possibility to explain how these regions are interrelated in the 1PP task in this 
experiment. Finally, it is likely that the activations in these brain areas are 
common for 1PP and 3PP and for this reason the parietal regions are involved in 
general processes of perspective taking in autism.   
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On the other hand, the social representative dimension (PG) exhibited that the 
autistic children in 1PP were significantly slower to the right space in respect to 
TD for whom there were no differences at the spatial level respect to 1PP in the 
factor space. This confirms the findings of different studies that account for 
impairments in different tasks that are related to the self perspective in autism 
(Lee and Hobson, 1998; Loveland and Landry 1986; Lee et al., 1994; O´keefe, 
2008; Baron- Cohen, 1998; Leslie and Thaiss, 1992; Kasari et al., 1993; Heerey et 
al., 2003; Hobson et al., 2006; Lombardo et al., 2007; Silani et al., 2008 and 
Henderson et al., 2009). Therefore, demonstrating that there exist difficulties in 
the self in a visual perspective task in children with ASD.  
Moreover the ASD group showed in PG Dimension, unlike in 1PP, that in 3PP 
was slower to the left space in comparison with the TD group.  
These results could suggest that the subjects with autism have some impairments 
in the left hemisphere to perform social tasks associated with the 1PP and also 
some impairments in the right hemisphere to perform tasks related with the 3PP, 
because the neural correlates mostly linked with 1PP were observed in the left 
hemisphere and the right hemisphere regions in task related with 3PP (Rubi and 
Decety, 2001; Volgeley et al., 2004).     
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CONCLUSION 
 
This research could increase the knowledge about some aspects related to how 
spatial perception could be compromised in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
and how this in turn affect the social interaction.       
 
The findings of the first experiment could be an evidence for the presence of 
dysfunction in right hemispheric spatial attention mechanism in ASD children, 
using a procedure from cognitive neuropsychology known as the global/local task. 
This could be the beginning of an evidence of certain spatial perception symptoms 
that could yield neural characteristics in ASD. 
    
On the other hand, the findings of the second experiment suggest that the ASD 
children have a similar behaviour in VPT task as the patients with neglect because 
there is an ease in children with ASD for answering in the right-side and longer 
times toward the left-side in a base condition as the 1PP in a predominantly 
perceptual task. Meanwhile in this same task, in the 3PP the results demonstrated 
how the difficulties disappear in the left space just like patients with neglect have 
demonstrated (Becchio et al., 2011). This is because it seems that perspective 
taking significantly ameliorated the responses (RTs) in the left space when the 
ASD children assumed a different spatial perspective (3PP).  
 
Finally, in a representational task the autistic children in 1PP were significantly 
slower to the right in respect to TD, this findings suggest that there is dissociation 
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between perceptual and representational tasks just like patients with neglect show 
(Ortigue et al., 2001). Moreover this could demonstrate the findings of different 
studies that account for impairments in different tasks that are related to the self-
perspective difficulties in the 1PP in a visual perspective task in children with 
ASD.  For this reason we might hypothesize a predominant less activation on the 
left structures of the brain for doing tasks related with the self but reinforced when 
there is a social representative dimension.  
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